The Church and Its Responsibility to Foster Knowledge by Buckley, Michael J., S.J.
Santa Clara University 
Scholar Commons 
Religious Studies College of Arts & Sciences 
Summer 1991 
The Church and Its Responsibility to Foster Knowledge 
Michael J. Buckley S.J. 
Santa Clara Univeristy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/rel_stud 
 Part of the Religion Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Buckley, M. J. (1991). The Church and Its Responsibility to Foster Knowledge. Current Issues in Catholic 
Higher Education 12(1), pp . 41-46. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts & Sciences at Scholar Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Religious Studies by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more 
information, please contact rscroggin@scu.edu. 
The Church and its Responsibility to Foster Knowledge 
Michael J. Buckley, SJ 
Father Greeley has given an insightful and eloquent 
appeal for reflection upon things Catholic-for a retrieval 
within the Catholic universities of the richness of the 
Catholic symbolic experience. I can only second his ap-
peal. But the task that Alice Callin and Tim O'Meara have 
assigned me bears upon a different question, one that Mr. 
O'Meara framed in this manner: Should the church foster 
learning that is on the face of it secular? More specifically, 
should the church encourage, yes, even nurture as part of 
its own mission research into the physical and biological 
sciences? This question could obviously be extended fur-
ther-into the social sciences, the professions of law, busi-
ness, and medicine, even the humanities-but 45 minutes 
demands that I limit my compass. Father Greeley has 
argued the thesis that the Catholic university must foster 
things Catholic. Mr. O'Meara's question comes almost by 
way of complementary counterpoint: Should the church 
as such be vitally engaged in the knowledge that is neither 
intrinsically Catholic nor immediately religious? 
I. THE SPECIFICATION OF THE 
QUESTION 
Let me spend some initial moments in specifying this 
question. Mr. O'Meara has not asked if the Catholic 
university precisely as a university should foster the 
physical and biological sciences. The answer to such a 
question would be obvious-if the institution wishes to 
be a university. Rather the issue is whether the church, 
precisely as such, should foster these sciences. Is there 
something about the nature and mission of the Christian 
community that underscores those obligations incum-
bent upon the university as such, something about the 
church which uniquely supports the common respon-
sibilities of higher education and which would give 
added meaning and warrant to the remarkable proposi-
tion of the present pope that the church needs the 
. . 1 
umvers1ty. 
But is the answer to such a question not a banality? Do 
not the dogmatic commitments of the church emphasize 
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that creation is a gift? Does this sense of gift not mean 
that we should pay attention-even in the most dis-
ciplined and serious manner-to what God has 
entrusted to us?2 Has not the church insisted since the 
attack of Manichaeism that the world is good and that 
matter and history are the stuff of salvation? Does not 
creation give obvious importance and even a religious 
dimension to the work of science? And has all of this 
not been repeated a thousand times! 
Let me counter with agreement and disagreement. 
There is something generically true about such a 
response-but that constitutes its fa tal flaw and the easy 
deceptiveness about the response. It offers us a comfort-
able journey down what RS. Crane called "the high 
priori road"; i.e., assuming the relevance and authority 
of theoretic doctrines prior to the examination of con-
crete issues and evidence.3 It does explain why Chris-
tianity has exhibited a pervasive sympathy for nature 
and for the disciplines with which it is explored. But this 
explanation remains at a level so abstract that it does not 
touch our actual issues as they have emerged in the 
crises within history, nor does it reach the level of obliga-
tion- "should the church"-at which our question has 
been posed. To be satisfied with it is to be informed by 
neither recent history nor current concrete Catholic 
practice. 
Can any Catholic recall without blushing, for example, 
the papal brief on Darwinism: "A system," wrote Pius 
IX, "which is repugnant at once to history, to the tradi-
tion of all peoples, to exact science, to observed facts, and 
even to reason herself would seem to need no refutation, 
did not alienation from God and the leaning to 
materialism, due to depravity, eagerly seek support in 
all this tissue of fables." 4 Does not the same shame rise 
when one recalls that the works of Copernicus and 
Galileo remained on the Index of Forbidden Books into the 
nineteenth century? Can we not remember that the 
volumes of Teilhard de Chardin were ordered removed 
from the shelves of Catholic libraries within our own 
life-time? All of this is common knowledge, so common 
that it undermines something of the credibility of the 
church and feeds the extravagant myth of an inherent 
antagonism between science and religion. Each year 
freshmen courses in Western Civilization retrace some-
thing of this path laid by some religious leadership. But 
not just freshmen! Are Catholic university presidents 
unaware that at the very end of the last century, the first 
president of Cornell University, Andrew Dickson White 
[1832-1918], compiled case after case of such repression 
in his massive 1896 work A History of the Warfare of 
Science with Theology in Christendom? 
Science in abstracto and science in the day-by-day-
the church has a long history of positive affirmations 
ranging from benignity to significant assist; but the great 
revolutionary changes in science have sometimes met 
misunderstanding, resistance, and even repression-
not just by church leaders, but by theologians and 
manualists. Perhaps the key here is "misunderstand-
ing." These moments were often the result not of vi-
ciousness or politics-though this could not be 
extended to the Galileo fiasco-but to an intractable 
narrowness, an ignorant misreading, a positive 
paranoia before novelties which were equated with 
threat: "Nihil innovetur nisi quod traditum est," was 
easily extended to the constitution of the world and the 
nature of its origins. But here the paradox becomes 
more acute. The heliocentric universe was condemned 
by some theologians and ecclesiastic authorities not be-
cause they failed to understand Copernicus, Kepler or 
Nevrton, but because they failed to understand the Book 
of }'ldges or the accommodation principles of Thomas 
Aquinas. Fear arose about evolution because ecclesias-
tics like Henry Edward Cardinal Manning judged it "a 
brutal philosof?hy-to wit, there is no God, and the ape 
is our Adam."5 It was often a decadent theology and 
barren philosophy that constructed these artificial an-
tinomies or which failed to mediate between the gospel 
and the developing culture. Here, as often as not, the 
issue lay not so much with the new sciences as with a 
theologically sound understanding of the basic 
patrimony of the church that alone could make novelties 
welcome and mediation possible. 
So the question-if it is not to be a banality-can be 
honed more precisely. Should the church, as such, 
foster science, science even at its most inventive mo-
ments, science when its conclusions seem raw or when 
it opens a frontier that seems to contradict what has been 
accepted even as dogma, when a synthesis has not been 
made between faith and science in this new area of 
inquiry? It is not simply obvious that the church should 
foster such knowledge. Nor is it simply regressive to see 
it undermining the belief of ordinary Catholics. In pur-
suit of its responsibilities, church authority has looked 
at the concrete effects of such knowledge and sometimes 
inhibited such research and teaching as "confusing the 
faithful." 
But one need not become unfair or hysterical over this 
history. The church has contributed enough encourage-
ment to science in general during these centuries, and 
the caution that ecclesiastics have exhibited can find its 
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secular counterparts with the efforts of American 
universities to deny the dangerous doctrines of Profes-
sor Shockley a hearing or with the unspoken demand 
for politically correct opinions, or with the es tab-
lishment as departmental orthodoxies a particular ver-
sion of analytic philosophy or literary criticism, or with 
the prolonged unwillingness even to entertain the 
original theories of Alfred Wegener about plate tec-
tonics. The problem is a profoundly human one, not 
exclusively an ecclesial one. But our ecclesial history 
does furnish added weight to our question: Should the 
church as such encourage and foster all genuine and 
ethical scientific inquiry no matter where it seems to be 
tending? I say "ethical" deliberately because I am con-
cerned in these remarks with dogmatic compatibility, 
not with the more technological uses or experimental 
inquiries of science that raise serious questions of 
morality and ethics. 
But our question is sharpened still further if we con-
sider the present attacks on science within American 
higher education, attacks that issue from the challenge 
of deconstructionism, that are mounted in the name of 
egalitarian leveling of all "logocentric hierarchies," that 
are embodied in what is present and what is omitted in 
the current university conflicts over a canon of ap-
propriate texts or the content of a core curriculum.6 All 
of this makes Mr. O'Meara' s question more real: Why 
should the church, even before pockets of academic 
indifference or hostility, encourage and support a pas-
sion for scientific inquiry? 
II. THESIS 1 
As a response, I should like to advance two theses: (1) 
In one way or another, contemporary scientific inquiry 
raises serious questions about ultimacies and so con-
stitutes part of the present religious problematic; (2) The 
scientific passion for the truth about the world is a part 
of that general passion for truth that makes faith-any 
vital faith-possible. One of my theses deals with 
science as a body of knowledge, as a content; the other 
deals with it as a method or procedure and a habit of 
mind. Let me explore each of them in the time that has 
been allotted to me. 
Over the past 30 years, the relationship between the 
physical sciences and the religious dimensions of life has 
radically altered. One can better assess this sea-change 
if it is seen in contrast with the intellectual settlements 
between science and religion since the dawn of moder-
nity. Drawing these intellectual covenants in very 
broad brush strokes, I would suggest that these cen-
turies have seen four significantly different rela tion-
ships: subsumption, separation or isola tion, alienation, 
and correlation. Let me say a shamefully brief paragraph 
to illustrate each. 
Subsumption: In the 17th and 18th centuries, natural 
philosophy or physics or experimental science was sub-
sumed as the foundation for religion, most specifically 
for the assertion of the existence of God. Certainly this 
was the interest that drove much of Isaac Newton, but 
one can also find it at the concerns of such scientific 
giants as Robert Boyle and John Ray and in the resultant 
physicotheologies of William Derham and William 
Paley. The evidence from physics became those of 
geometrical design and functional subservience, and the 
mathematics embedded in the universe pointed to a 
universal geometer. Foundational religious reflection 
often looked to science for its warrant to assert its fun-
damental assertions about God. 
Separation: Under Laplace and Lagrange, physics and 
astronomy freed themselves from furnishing the foun-
dations for religious assertions. William Herschel 
recorded the conversation between Napoleon, then first 
consul of France, with M. de Laplace on August 8, 1802. 
The subject was the sidereal heavens, and Napoleon 
asked in a tone of admiration: "And who is the author 
of all of this?" Laplace maintained that a series of natural 
causes could account for this phenomenon. "This, the 
First Consul rather opposed." The story has been 
simplified by having Laplace respond to Napoleon with 
the celebrated retort: "I have no need of that hypothesis°," 
and then maintaining that Laplace's astronomy was 
atheistic. That interpretation is false. Laplace is simply 
saying, in opposition to Newton's System of the World and 
to the "Queries" at the end of Newton's Optics, that 
science was self-contained, that it would not furnish the 
basis for religion.7 The new settlement was to be be-
tween two distinct, isolated, and methodologically in-
different fields. 
Alienation: In the 19th century, the evolutionary 
theories of Darwin and Wallace were read as eliminating 
both the classic argument from design as well as a spe-
cial place for human consciousness, a consciousness that 
both philosophers and theologians had made integral 
for the establishment of the existence of God. Many 
religious leaders and scientists read this development as 
a fundamental change in the relationship between 
science and religion; i.e., as an attack and contradiction. 
With such rare exceptions as John Henry Newman, they 
understood it basically as threat. Cardinal Wiseman 
received permission from the Holy See to found an 
academia, one to which he summoned the faithful of 
England in these words: "Now it is for the Church which 
alone possesses divine certainty and divine discern-
ment, to place itself at once in the front of a movement 
which threatens even the fragmentary remains of Chris-
tian belief in England." In his Terry Lectures, John 
Dewey in the United States announced that religious 
belief with any supernatural content could not survive 
before the surge in the empirical sciences. During the 
important Solvay Conference of 1927, Dirac and Pauli 
expressed amazement to Heisenberg that Einstein could 
evince any respect for religious consciousness.8 Our 
own generations grew up in that atmosphere of hostility 
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and alienation and-because of our ignorance of his-
tory-were indoctrinated easily to talk about the "an-
cient" battle between science and religious. 
But within our lifetime, this settlement has begun to 
give way before an unexpected development. Increas-
ingly, scientists such as P.W. Atkins, Robert K. Adair, 
and Harald Fritzsch find themselves in basic agreement 
with the theoretical physicist, Paul W. Davies: "Right or 
wrong, the fact that science has actually advanced to the 
point where what were formerly religious questions can 
be seriously tackled itself indicates the far-reaching con-
sequences of the new physics." In fact, Davies claims 
quite flatly: "It may seem bizarre, but in my o~inion, 
science offers a surer path to God than religion." 
This is no place to survey the evidence that Davies and 
others mount, but this much must be said. The way the 
contemporary world reveals itself in its fundamental 
constitution and origins poses or suggests enormous 
questions of ultimacy, even if (pace Davies) it does not 
answer them. This is neither unprecedented nor extraor-
dinary; what is extraordinary is the growing recognition 
that this is the case. Any human situation, explored with 
careful discipline and examined in depth, raises ques-
tions of ultimacy for which the methodology at hand is 
unequipped. This can occur in two ways: First, it dis-
closes problems about its own foundations, about the 
validity of its own presuppositions, the reference claims 
that can be made for its axiomatic sets, its postulates, and 
finally its relationship to other kinds of knowledge. 
Second, a thorough scientific inquiry may well establish 
conclusions which themselves raise further questions or 
hint toward further knowledge which its own methodol-
ogy cannot responsibly treat. Such an inquiry may sug-
gest possibilities about the universe which it cannot 
responsibly explore. It has classically been the function 
of metaphysics to deal with the first of these sets of 
problems; i.e., to inquire into the foundations of science 
and of mathematics and into the relationship of one area 
of knowledge with another. But is it the second in-
evitable development of scientific knowledge, the ques-
tions about ultimacy and about rec.eding horizons that 
it raises, which inevitably involves the interest of 
religion. For religion, or the disciplined reflection upon 
religious experience that we can call theology, is essen-
tially about the ultimacies, the absolutes that impinge 
upon human existence and that elicit a possibility of the 
world embodying mysteriously the personal inter-
change between the divine and human. 
Let me give one example: If one looks at the fun-
damental constants of nature, one comes to see the 
universe as breath-takingly, unimaginably finely tuned. 
For example, as Stephen Hawking has written, if "the 
rate of expansion one second after the Big Bang had been 
smaller by even one part in a hundred thousand million 
million, it (the material universe) would have recol-
lapsed before it reached its present size." If, on the other 
hand, the rate of expansion had been ever so slightly 
greater, the expansion would have been too great for 
stars and planets to form. The universe would have been 
impossible.10 That fine-tuning can be found in such 
fundamentals as the mass of the electron, the strength of 
the strong nuclear force, the relationship between mat-
ter and anti-matter. This number of such "remarkable 
coincidences" can admittedly be advanced indefinitely. 
Some are using these data, as did Boyle and Newton 
to establish an argument for the existence of God. This 
seems to me misguided. But what I do think is legitimate 
-not to say hypnotizing-is that at the very minimum 
they raise the question about purpose and personality 
in the universe. Such evidence gives a new basis, a new 
plausibility to the question: Is there then mind and 
purpose, even a care for human beings, at the basis of 
our existence? 
Now the reaction to this kind of knowledge or recog-
nition among theologians and thinkers within the 
church has been threefold. The vast majority, knowing 
nothing about science, wary, suspicious or at best 
respecting it at a great remove, are ignorant of these 
developments or of their enormous importance in our 
understanding of the world. Consequently, they cannot 
appropriate the character or the contours of this 
problematic situation that contemporary culture is 
framing for religious inquiry and responses. The 
second, enthusiastic about this new knowledge, join 
tho~e scientists who enlist these data to ground religious 
affirrnations about the existence and nature of God. This 
seen.s to me a categorical error, one that mingles dif-
ferent kinds of knowledge and repeats the errors of the 
seventeenth century. But the third reaction has been to 
treat this new knowledge in one field as constituting a 
set of problems, questions leveled at religion. The cos-
mological constants-the emergence of life, the ap-
pearance of consciousness, expansive if not directional 
evolution-raise the possibility of profound purpose in 
this universe of some eighteen billion years. 
This raises in a very different way the question of 
God-in a new and newly very plausible way. Does not 
the church which talks about God and Christ, even the 
cosmic Christ, about providence and salvation, have a 
way of taking up these issues, transposing them into 
properly theological questions and in terms of theologi-
cal methodologies and evidence,dealing with these in a 
way that the physical sciences cannot? It is consequent 
upon the mission of the church that it foster, encourage, 
and be in vital contact with scientific inquiry not because 
science will answer the questions of religion, but be-
cause it poses some of them. 
For in scientific inquiry, the world progressively dis-
closes itself. Theological research, investigation, and in-
struction will only be as vital as the questions they 
address. These questions will possess vitality to the 
degree that they emerge out of life. Science easily con-
stitutes one of the greatest and most continual efforts of 
the human intellect to push to its ultimate what we know 
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about our world and about our lives. The church can and 
must encourage the advance of this knowledge, confi-
dent that the reach of the mind will extend into a 
profoundly religious dimension-that questions will be 
elicited that the science or the discipline itself cannot 
resolve. For science in so many different ways mediates 
the world to religious consciousness. As that world 
becomes progressively engaged-whether in molecular 
biology or astrophysics or cosmology or quantum 
mechanics, it will raise issues not merely about the social 
and ethical implications of what is discovered-matters 
of enormous moral interest to the church-but about the 
meaning or purpose in the universe, the pervasiveness 
of matter, the eschatological destiny of all that we know. 
The church must foster science as a body of knowledge 
because it must engage the religious dimensions of this 
selfdisclosure of the world. For such a disclosure through 
its questions evokes new insights into the significance of 
the gospel and the concrete meaning of the One in w horn 
and through whom and for whom all things were 
made.11 
We advance in our understanding of the unique Christo-
logical significance of salvation as we understand the 
world to which Christ is the immeasurable response-as 
He is seen to respond to the questions that the physical 
universe and human life pose about existence and 
meaning. 
Understood in this way, science forms part of the 
problematic situation for contemporary theology. If the 
church wants the mystery that it bears taken seriously 
and if it wants to come to deeper understanding of this 
mystery itself, then the church must foster all those 
human engagements in which ultimate questions are 
uncovered in depth and presented with urgency and 
which cry out for a religious transposition and theologi-
cal reflection. If, on the other hand, the church ignores 
these developments-and how many members of CTSA 
or of your theology departments have anything that 
could qualify as scientific literacy?-then theology loses 
the vitality that this contact with culture can uniquely 
offer. One can advance this first thesis slightly further: 
If one really understands only the answer itself when 
one has grasped the question-if the response becomes 
clear only as one sees something of wha t is its fun-
damental question, then one can ask the church and its 
theologians how much they understand about the 
gospel (i.e., the recapitulation of all things in Christ) 
when they do not see or understand so much of the 
world to which it is response and good news. 
That is the first thesis I wish to defend: The church 
must encourage or foster science because science done 
with integrity constitutes something of the problematic 
situation which confronts the reflection, yes, even the 
self-understanding of the church. 
III. THESIS 2 
May I now use the time I still have available to advance 
a second thesis. Here I do not intend to deal with science 
as an expanding body of knowledge, but as a habit of 
mind issuing in a methodologically selfconscious, exact 
and demanding exploration of the world in order to 
determine what is true about it. I take it that this is the 
purpose of science, no matter how different and no 
matter how instrumental may be its best available con-
clusions. I take it that this is where the almost hypnotic 
appeal of the scientific enterprise lies, whether its effort 
be bent on solving problems of tensor calculus or build-
ing a multibillion-dollar super-conducting supercol-
lider, whether it be purely theoretic in its interests in 
subatomic physics or technologically oriented towards 
global warming and space stations. There can be an 
addictive appeal in learning what is the case, what is the 
solution to a problem, what is the truth about things. 
This dedication constitutes the scientific mind at its 
finest. Not just the scientific mind, of course, but the 
scientific habit is one generic form of this dedication, one 
of its strongest forms in contemporary culture. 
I am as aware as you of the vanity and the vicious 
competition, of the ego-investments and financial greed 
that can and has entered into this world. But there is at 
its best-a best which the church must encourage and 
reverence-there is a grandeur, a purity of heart, a self-
transcendence that the scientific mind calls for, a 
profound orientation towards the truth. In this orienta-
tion, it seems to me, one encounters the absolute; i.e., that 
which is directive and normative of all life and is itself 
not governed or subject or relative or dependent upon 
anything else. This may not necessarily emerge in the 
conclusions of the work of the scientist, but the decencies 
of his or her calling dictate that it be always operative in 
the uncompromising claim that truth makes upon the 
direction that this work takes. Truth is both the horizon 
towards which the scientist moves and the imperative 
that directs her or his choices. The scientist, as a scientist, 
is called upon to explore what is the case in as imagina-
tive and as disciplined a form as possible and to tell the 
truth that his research discloses with a disciplined exact-
itude. 
Now, in order to focus my argument at this point, I 
should like to direct your attention to what may seem a 
very dry and inconsequential proposition in Thomistic 
theology. It is the very first issue that Aquinas raises 
when he deals with faith. He asks this question: What is 
the formal object of faith? In other words, what is the 
indispensable aspect under which you must see what 
you are asked to believe, that aspect by which something 
becomes credible and which entails the inescapable 
commitment for making an act of faith? And he answers 
this very simply. The formal object of faith is the 
primary, the absolute truth [II-II.1.1] . Christian faith for 
Aquinas is not a blind leap in the dark; it is not opposed 
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to cognoscitive rigor, nor does it constitute a voluntaris-
tic sacrificium intellectus. "One would not believe if 
she/he did not see that these things were to be believed" 
[II-II.1.4. ad 2]. You believe something because you 
believe someone; and you believe someone because you 
believe that he/she speaks the truth. The grace of faith, 
he says very simply, "makes one see the things that are 
believed" [II-II.1.4. ad 3]. The content of your faith and 
the source of your faith are conditioned by this absolute 
or primary commitment-an uncompromising, non-ne-
gotiable commitment to the truth: "nothing can fall 
under faith except so far as it stands under the first 
truth" [II.II.1.3] . It is in this way that faith does not 
contradict intellectual activity, but "brings under-
standing to its completion" [II-II.1.3. ad 1]. Only this 
commitment to truth can make authentic faith possible: 
both the commitment of God to its revelation and the 
surrender of a human being to its absolute primacy.12 
I suggest that under that seemingly dry proposition of 
Aquinas he is proposing an understanding of Catholic 
faith that makes the church's encouragement of zealous, 
self-sacrificing science a matter of crucial moment. To 
evoke authentic faith, the church must foster in every 
possible way an uncompromising commitment to the 
truth, in whatever way it discloses itself. The Christian 
community must give itself to build a world in which 
truth is explored, disclosed, and spoken. The church 
itself must be understood- or come to be more vitally-
the place where truth is reverenced and demanded and 
spoken. For this openness to the real-whether one of 
physical nature or of mathematical coherence or ofbiologi-
cal and human nature-this acceptance of what is simp-
ly because it is is a fundamental condition for the 
possibility of Christian faith. As this disposition 
dominates the scientific mind-and the church must 
encourage it to be faithful to itself-as it governs and 
directs a person's entire career, as it permeates teaching 
and drives research through difficult, discouraging and 
dogged moments, as it works against the vices and the 
narrowness that make for dishonesty and pretense, as it 
counters a defensive unwillingness to face up to the way 
things are, such a disposition develops in the mind those 
habits which are essential if faith is to be authentic. For 
the finest reaches of the scientific mind lie in an un-
deviating determination towards the truth; and from the 
time of Paul it has been said that the failure in faith is 
basically a "failure to love the truth and be saved" [2 
Thes 2:10]. 
It is of vital importance that the church encourage, 
demand, propose, or foster every serious engagement 
by which human dedication and its consequent effort 
engage itself with an enterprise whose purpose is truth. 
And what must the church ask at those crisis-mo-
ments when scientific inquiry and dogmatic assertion 
seem to clash, when they even appear to contradict? 
That both continue their inquiries or experiments, their 
discussions and reconsideration without impediment or 
mutual condemnation, as Cardinal Newman wrote, 
"with full faith in the consistency of that multiform 
truth, which they share between them, in a generous 
confidence that they will be ultimately consistent, one 
and all, in their combined results though there may be 
momentary collisions, awkward appearances and many 
f b d . d h . f . " 13 ore o mgs an prop ec1es o contranety. 
In my opinion, one could argue even further that this 
costly love for truth is not only a disposition for faith but 
as it becomes absolute and universal constitutes that 
universal surrender which Karl Rahner has signaled as 
transcendental faith: the obedient acceptance of God 
revealing Himself as the all-guiding, all-governing 
truth, permeating all things, giving meaning and urgen-
cy to its smallest participation and confronting one con-
tinually in a relationship of absolute closeness and 
summons. The day-by-day honest drudgery of science 
1. Pope John Paul II, "The Church Needs the University," March 8, 
1982, L'OsservatoreRomano, English edition (3 May 1982), 6. 
2. s ,,e the remarks of Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 44-48. The mat-
ter can be framed through a simple parable: If a young man loves a 
worn.in, he may show his love by giving her a ring. Now there are 
many things which the woman can do. The most vicious would be to 
take the ring and forget the love that is behind it. That would be the 
most vicious-but it would not be the most stupid. The most stupid 
thing she could do would be to think. that the ring and the man were 
in competition-that it was not a sacrament of his love but its competi-
tion-and that somehow or other she could show her love for him be 
denigrating the ring: "What a lousy piece of metal-only eight caret 
diamond-how little worth it has compared with you, honey'" One 
does not enhance one's relationship with God by despising or ignoring 
the gifts that God has given as a pledge of an eternal love. 
3. RS. Crane, "Criticism as Inquiry; or, The Perils of the 'High Priori 
Road,"' The Idea of the Humanities (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1967), vol. ii, 29. 
4. Cited by Andrew Dickson White, in "The Final Effort of Theology," 
as in Darwin, selected and edited by Philip Appleman (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1970), 366. These papal briefs are printed in full in 
Constantin James, Mes Entretiens avec l'Empereur Don Pedro sur le Dar-
winisme (Paris, 1888), see Darwin, 367, n.2. 
5. Henry Edward Cardinal Manning, Essays on Religion and Literature 
(London, 1865), as cited in Darwin, 364nl. 
6. John Searle in his recent "The Battle over the University," noted the 
general lack of a coherent theory of undergraduate education and 
spoke with amazement of one of the most recent and best attempts to 
build such a theory, The Voice of Liberal Learning by the English 
philosopher Michael Oakeshott: 
"Perhaps the biggest single weakness of his conception 
of education is in the peripheral status it assigns to the 
natural sciences. The natural sciences do not fit his 
model, because, for the most part, the world of the 
natural sciences is not a world of meanings. It is a world 
of things; it is a world of entities, such a s molecules or 
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could well constitute the categorical mediation of such 
transcendental revelation and its responding faith. 14 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I have attempted to answer Tim O'Meara's question 
with the two theses that these pages have only been able 
to outline. Each of them needs more development and 
nuance, but the basic point is this: The church must 
encourage scientific inquiry as it must care for the sour-
ces of its own vitality. It must both foster an undeviating 
determination for the truth wherever this occurs as the 
only matrix out of which Christian faith can emerge, and 
it must further those disciplined inquiries whose natural 
dynamism develops into those profound questions or 
suggestions about ultimacy that constitute the religious 
dimensions of life and reach towards the unspeakable 
mystery that is God. 
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